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Image Flow: Photography on Tap1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This essay is about the phenomenon of mass, mobile photographic images in a digital, 
networked context. In response to recent writings that challenge the relevance of the close 
reading of singular images, it proposes rethinking the opposition between singular images 
and images en masse through philosophical ideas of multiplicity and, in particular, via the 
concept of image flow. It examines four connected contexts in which concepts of flow have 
been used: in discourses surrounding the internet and digital media, where it is used to 
naturalise these media; in psychology, where ideas of flow underpin descriptions of 
consciousness and human/ animal perception; in robotics and Artificial Intelligence, where 
ideas of flow from psychology joined with a move away from dependence on representation 
to facilitate increasingly autonomous mobile machines; and finally, in studies of television, 
where the on-tap transmission of images has been understood in terms of a flow that 
articulates or choreographs bodies and attention, connecting the rhythms and temporality of 
private and public space, cities and suburbs. This model of flow, in particular, allows for 
analysis that operates across different scales, and undoes oppositions of scale and surface / 
depth that pervade recent photography theory.   
 
Key words: flow, photography theory, digital image, networked image, new media, 
technology, mass reproduction 
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World is crazier and more of it than we think, 
Incorrigibly plural. I peel and portion 
A tangerine and spit the pips and feel 
The drunkenness of things being various. 
        
        Louis MacNeice, from “Snow” (1935) 
 
Recently, Martin Lister identified the difficulties of sustaining critical-theoretical approaches 
to photography that treat images as singular, since we live in an era when images never 
appear individually. He writes that “The sheer degree of this change has rendered the analysis 
of singular images as discrete artefacts as largely inappropriate, the object of theory has 
changed”.2 He points to the way that digital images exist simultaneously in different places 
and are experienced as multiples: “We anticipate that behind an image we have alighted on 
there is another waiting or there is one, seen earlier, to be returned to. Rather than absorbing 
us in a singular manner each image seems to nudge us toward another”.3 A number of 
theorists, including Daniel Rubinstein and Katrina Sluis, have also written about how digital 
images appear “in series, repetitions, sequences, rapid volleys”, with no necessarily 
identifiable original.4 They raise the question of how we might analyse images that are also 
carriers of ever-changing accumulations of metadata, much of which is tenuously connected, 
if at all, to the visible content of the image.  
 Moreover, the very existence of something such as a photographic image, distinct 
from other media, becomes questionable when images are reducible to code. Friedrich Kittler 
puts it very succinctly, 
 
Sound and image, voice and text have become mere effects on the surface, or, to put it 
better, the interface for the consumer. . . . In computers everything becomes number: 
imageless, soundless, wordless quantity. And if the optical fiber network reduces all 
formerly separate data flows to one standardized digital series of numbers, any 
medium can be translated into another.5  
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 For contemporary photography theorists, the problem with paying attention to 
individual digital photographs is that any single interpretation of an image addresses only the 
surface manifestation, not the code or the data concealed beneath. The algorithm is 
increasingly understood as the reality of an image whose visual appearance is no longer its 
principal or most salient characteristic. The end of the single and singular image seems to 
announce the irrelevance of approaches that treat the image as representation as well as of 
practices of close reading.6 
 Not only are digital images reducible to numbers, they are also no longer self-
evidently still. They are quickly reproducible, exist in multiple simultaneous copies in 
different locations without an identifiable original and change their substance with each 
refresh of the screen. The photographic image is often indistinguishable from the video still. 
Ingrid Hoelzl and Rémy Marie write that digitalization introduces a new kind of image “no 
longer a solid representation of a solid world... but an unstable algorithmic configuration” — 
a “softimage.”7 There is a risk, though, of this analysis of the digital networked image 
overestimating the stillness, solidity, stability and singularity of pre-digital photographs.  
Similar statements to Lister’s have been made regarding photographs in general, as they are 
experienced in everyday contexts: in 1982, Victor Burgin commented on how they require 
only a brief glance,  and then “almost invariably, another photograph is always in position to 
receive the displaced look”.8 More recently, Paul Frosh claimed that “...photographs seem to 
be integrated — more seamlessly perhaps than other representations — into a total 
fluctuating environment in which the individual image loses its singular claims on the 
viewer's attentive gaze”.9 
 Even in the case of art, the singularity of an individual image was always a useful 
fiction: as art historians have argued, the discipline of art history itself was itself built on 
reproductions, even when it fetishized the “original”.10 Close reading of an individual image 
could be described as a synchronic slicing of time, an artificial pause for the purposes of 
analysis. The association of close reading with stasis is aggravated by what Frosh calls the 
“attentive fallacy”: the idea that meaning and interpretation take place in a “distinct, focused 
encounter between a visually immobilized viewer and a discrete and equally stationary 
image”.11 Yet images have long been taken, printed and reprinted, projected and reproduced 
in multiples, and photographic techniques are frequently inseparable from other technologies. 
Even a photographic print changes significance with each new context, and new caption, and 
the physical object ages and mutates.  
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 While I would not dispute many of these claims made about the digital networked 
image, here I want to challenge the implied distinction between pre-digital images that may 
be attended to individually and semiotically, and digital networked images that (it is claimed) 
should not be, since they are a mass phenomenon whose visual appearance conceals a deeper, 
more systemic significance. I want to do so, not simply by reasserting the importance of close 
attention to the visual, but by questioning what it means to consider an image as isolated or 
singular in the first place, and how we envisage the movement of images through networks. I 
also want to suggest that this reduction of the image to data is not the only way in which 
images become available to be seen or “read” by machines, but that this is possible with the 
advent of light-sensing machines, which read the image not (or not only) as data but as an 
inscription of light (as photographic). This analysis will rely less on a sharp distinction 
between analogue and digital image, and more on a broader category of technical images 
which encompasses both.12 
  
Metadata and Microbiota 
 Rubinstein and Sluis write, “it is not identity that the networked image delivers to the 
screen, but rather an image of the multiplicity engendered by the network”.13  The screen 
image is a temporary stopping-point in a process by which the networked image reproduces 
itself but also changes as it accumulates metadata, tags and “likes”.  It is not just that there 
are innumerable networked images, multiplying, reproducing and being produced and 
circulated, but that the image itself is a multitude, a growing and changing mass of data. This 
accumulative data facilitates the interactions of the image, renders it legible to other 
machines, subjects the users and producers of images to invisible surveillance and tracking, 
but it is also arbitrary, misleading, irrational, contaminated with so-called “human error”. 
 Writing in the mid-1980s, Vilém Flusser argued that we can distinguish technical 
images from traditional images by the fact of their being constituted out of particles (grains of 
silver, electrons). Of course, one might argue that the whole universe is constituted in this 
way, but as Flusser suggested, the difference is that we cannot “bracket out” our knowledge 
of this granular structure, since it alone made the technical image possible.14 Bernard 
Stiegler, writing a decade later, also suggested that discontinuity (or “discreteness”) is not 
only a property of digital images, rather, “The continuity of the analog image is a reality 
effect which ought not to conceal the fact that the analog image is always already discrete”.15 
However, he argued that digital technologies push this very far, enabling images to be 
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disassembled or “decomposed”, not only into pixels but into a series of index-able and 
analyse-able properties and regularities, that can then be classified or batch-processed.16   
 Even so, the particulate structure of the analog, chemical photograph is not fixed, 
once and for all. It is an incomplete accumulation. Following Deleuze and Guattari, we might 
see our tendency to treat bodies and images as singular as part of a Western tradition of 
thought that relies on a separation of human from technology but also human from animal,  
and of the singular organism from the pack or swarm. In A Thousand Plateaus (1988), they 
suggest that such collectives are joined not just through family resemblance or relation but 
through contagion, bodies that interact with other bodies in relations of mutual dependence 
and co-creation. 17  
 To conceive of the image in this way we might use another analogy: that of our own 
bodies moving through different environments. Each of us carries with us our own gut flora – 
the microbiota that live inside human and animal guts include bacteria, fungi, viruses and 
other organisms – and they facilitate our interaction with, and digestion of, other materials. 
They are not other to, or separate from, the body but part of the multitude from which it is 
constituted. As we move through habitats we collect new microbiota and discard others. One 
theory of food allergy (the “old friends” theory) posits that our increasingly technological 
environments are relatively denuded of this necessary flora – we need to move through a 
historic grassland habitat in order to acquire these old friends.18 Despite the potentially 
questionable contrast between rich (historic, organic) and impoverished (modern, 
technological), and the impression that such “old friends” are always useful or functional, this 
theory provides one model for thinking about the movement of the image in that it implies 
that the body / image is not finished, complete and self-contained, but constantly 
reconstituting itself, and that habitat is not “environment ” (outside) but internal to this 
process. Technical images are mutually dependent on, and co-creative of other images and 
other materials. They are always multitudes – of marks, pixels, grains, photons as well as data 
and metadata.  
 
Distributed perception 
The electronically networked image challenges the ways in which images can be understood, 
not only because the image is a surface effect of calculable, numerical data, that could 
equally be translated into something entirely different, but also because perception or seeing 
now appear to be distributed beyond organisms. The separation of vision from a human 
observer in computational imaging, as noted by writers such as Jonathan Crary and Paul 
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Virilio, is compounded by the development of networks through which images travel and are 
translated without necessarily being intercepted or subjected to visual scrutiny by humans.19 
This produces a kind of “machinic vision”, by which I do not simply mean seeing by 
machines, but new intersections of human and machine processes, which transform the ways 
in which we understand and experience perception.   
 Deleuze sees this as pre-dating the digital image. For instance, in Cinema I: The 
Movement Image, and through a reading of Bergson’s Matter and Memory, he suggests that 
the redistribution of perception away from the human observer begins in cinema. Cinema is 
distinguished from photography by movement, and by its ability to represent not a series of 
instants but an increasingly acentric and constantly changing state of things. In cinema, 
Deleuze finds ways of seeing that do not simply extend human perception and augment the 
human eye with technology but which transfer perception from the subject position of a 
human observer into that of matter itself.20 Cinematic perception becomes “gaseous”, 
“liquid” and “molecular”. Movement is understood at the level of dissolving solid and 
discrete objects into the masses out of which they are constituted. This world is buzzing, 
swarming; all of reality is particulate, molecular, amassing — here is the influence of 
Spinoza for whom objects were distinguished not by substance but by movement, which at an 
atomic level separates soft from hard objects, solids from liquids and gases.21 
 This redistribution of perception that Deleuze found articulated in cinema, takes on 
new forms in the era of the internet, in the context of new machine-human assemblages, and 
a new kind of image that is “just one form that information can take”. 22 Nevertheless, it 
begins with photography, and the closer integration of human and machine seeing and image-
making that occurs with its technical  development. Still photographic images, whether 
delivered in volleys or not, do not articulate time and movement in the same way as 
cinematic and video images. Even so, they are mobile, multiple and embodied regardless of 
whether they are digital. Furthermore, dreams and bodies, and mental (embodied) images, are 
now caught up with technical images. The art historian Hans Belting terms these endogenous 
and exogenous images, and describes a circulation between the two kinds23. In this 
circulation, humans are part of the network through which images move. If perception, 
imagination, interpretation and attention are embodied activities, intimately connected to the 
production of images, then it is not such a leap to think of bodies as media and media as 
bodily.  
 
Moving Images 
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 How to describe this circulation, this movement of images? Ivan Kopytoff and Arjun 
Appadurai introduced terms such as “biography” and “trajectory” for thinking about the 
movement of objects across society and through time.24 Such terms enable them to describe 
the “social life of things”, but they are not necessarily helpful or particularly vivid as a means 
to describe the movement of technical images. In an essay on the artist Gérard Fromanger, 
Foucault offers us the idea of the image as promiscuous escape artist, mobile but not 
unidirectional, and moving between media, bodies, across surfaces and screens.25 Foucault 
calls this an “image frenzy” and dates it to the late nineteenth century and the circulation of 
reproductions amongst artists in that period. This notion of a frenzied, buzzing movement is 
more apposite and very different from the image of seamless and continuous movement 
implied in the liquid metaphors used by technology companies, such as flow, surfing, 
photostream, streaming. Yet it is “flow” that I want to examine here, for the different fields of 
interest it brings together, which sets it apart from terms such as frenzy or trajectory. 
 In general, the terminology used by technology corporations to describe their products 
and processes evokes landscapes of clouds and streams, and a notion of cyclical time and 
movement, via the endless processes by which water is exchanged between earth and sky. 
Rubinstein and Sluis point out that the use of the term “flow” is ideological: “the cyberspeak 
of clouds, shadows, streams, farms and flows is misleading and unhelpful as it uses these 
bucolic metaphors to conceal the profound unknowability of big data.”26 Such terms 
naturalise and neutralise a process that is not just about the delivery of a product but also the 
harvesting of sometimes unwittingly or unwillingly supplied data. The concept of flow is also 
associated with capitalism, which seeks out “a smooth space” without obstacles to facilitate 
the movement of capital.27 
 Furthermore, analogies of flow imply not just movement but movement in a specific 
direction. Even in the case of water, the term gives a selective impression, of unbroken 
smoothness,  a sedate stream rather than a stormy sea or a river broken by rapids. Ghislain 
Thibault claims that fluid analogies applied to analogue media are appropriate insofar as 
analogue signals are continuous.28  The notion of electricity “flowing” is already an analogy, 
appropriated from hydromechanics to help people visualise the movement of electricity.  
Applied to digital media, such analogies are misleading since these are discontinuous, 
transmitted in bits and through the use of packet-switching. As Thibault argues, the language 
also suggests a continuity of experience and freedom of choice, a sense of liveness that more 
properly belongs to older analogue broadcast media and an idealised image of a continuous 
signal and perfect connection which was barely ever realised — in fact digital streaming is 
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more often than not subject to glitches, interrupted and fragmented by poor connections, 
intermittent signal or overloaded bandwidth.   
 Watery analogies also help to envision a continuity of movement without the 
movement of specific things. Deleuze writes of how French filmmakers were drawn to water 
partly because “because water is the most perfect environment in which movement can be 
extracted from the thing moved, or mobility from movement itself”.29 In other words, rather 
than the visual perception of movement being dependent on seeing an object in one place, 
and then seeing it relocated in another, running water provides a way of picturing movement 
in itself. Describing digital media and the movement of data in terms of flow does not depend 
on us envisaging discontinuities, discrete objects or packages of data. Furthermore, fluid 
metaphors imply an image, not just of movement, but of time: not only the cyclical time of 
nature but time as a stream: unidirectional, linear, unstoppable. They have the capacity to 
suggest the simultaneous presence of the past, in a stream of images that can be dipped into 
now (thus platforms like Facebook and Snapchat offer our own images back to us labelled as 
“memories”, prompting us to recirculate images selected by algorithm), and a tyrannical 
linear time, an inevitable onward movement.  
 
Flow and Consciousness 
 Thus a language of continuous flow and of streams offers a way of conceptualizing 
digital networked media as smooth, continuous, naturalized and harmonious, and of 
embedding it seamlessly into the passage of time in our own lives. Yet at the same time, it 
intimates potential disaster. Flow always risks overflow: there is always the sense of only just 
managing, the risk of too much, of flooding. The software through which we make, view and 
exchange images uses models for managing and retrieving data, and for capturing and 
sustaining attention. The specific techniques developed to make images available, searchable, 
viewable, such as the slideshow, the stream, the thumbnail image and so on, can also be 
understood as ways of attempting to control or program what might otherwise be experienced 
as an unmanageable and inassimilable onslaught or flood of images. 
 Contemporary artists and photographers have drawn attention to the ever-growing 
mass of online images: examples include Joan Fontcuberta’s Googlegrams (2006), Penelope 
Umbrico’s 5,377,183 Suns from Flickr (2009), and Eric Kessels 24 Hours installation (2011). 
Ideas of information overload or image saturation are particularly associated with moving 
image media such as television, but they are also familiar tropes in writing about 
contemporary visual culture in general: too much information, too many images, an attack of 
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visual stimuli that produce an immobilized, passive observer. While technology companies 
use terms such as “flow” to convince us of a seamless efficiency, media theorists use it to 
refer to a binge diet of rapid, endless and instant imagery facilitated by electronic media. 
These notions have much older roots too: in the nineteenth century image of the 
neuraesthenic incapacitated by modern urban life, for example. They describe a human 
sensorium overwhelmed by the pace and intensity of external stimuli.  
 At the same time, terms such as  “flow” and “stream” have been used to speak about 
the workings of consciousness in general. The idea of consciousness as flow can be found 
earlier, but is most associated with the psychologist William James, whose phrase “stream of 
thought” appears in his Principles of Psychology (1890). He wrote: “consciousness, then, 
does not appear to itself as chopped up in bits ... It is nothing jointed; it flows. A ‘river’ or a 
‘stream’ are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described”.30 A century later, Mihaly 
Czikszentmihalyi adopted the term “flow” to describe a sense of being deeply immersed in 
the present, un-self-consciously absorbed in a specific activity. The idea has been popularised 
to describe a state of absorption in creative, intellectual or artistic activity.31 For 
Czikszentmihalyi, media such as television tend to damage or inhibit flow: the rapid turnover 
of stimulation overwhelm or distract from the flow.32 
 While Czikszentmihalyi’s flow research finds electronic media, particularly 
television, to be incompatible with a flow of consciousness or deep thought, other theorists 
see the inbuilt temporalities, flows or rhythms of electronic media as able to be synchronised 
with the rhythms of our perceptive and cognitive apparatus.33 Either way, theories of flow in 
relation to media are theories of human cognitive processes as well as of technologies, insofar 
as they bring together questions of consciousness, attention and perception with technical 
structures that are built-in, hardwired or designed into different media.  
 
Intelligence without Representation 
 The obvious place to look for how ideas of technological vision come together with 
theories of consciousness is in the joined fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics. As 
the term “artificial intelligence” suggests, the field is founded on assumptions of affinities or 
similarities between computers and the human brain. However, in the late 1980s, there was a 
paradigm shift away from a dependence on representation, that is, away from the assumption 
that in order to develop intelligent behaviours such as autonomously navigating an 
environment, a robot first had to be able to model or represent the world to itself in a way that 
mimicked human intelligence. Roboticists turned towards the production of robots that could 
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perform specific tasks in a real (rather than artificially simplified) environment, without first 
modelling that environment to themselves.  
 In an article published in 1991 but written in 1987, Rodney Brooks described his 
research at MIT labs, where his team set out to build artificial intelligence in robots.  
Combinations of perception and activity were developed “incrementally” and “let loose”, on 
the basis that “mobility, acute vision and the ability to carry out survival related tasks in a 
dynamic environment provide a necessary basis for the development of true intelligence”.34 
In order to move, such robots had to be able to “see” and were equipped with television 
cameras. A live electromagnetic feed of images from one or two cameras (mimicking human 
stereoscopic vision) provided the input into the system, but in early versions, the robot had to 
use this input to model its environment before moving. In the early 1980s, according to 
Andrew Duchon and William Warren, these mobile robots could take a quarter of an hour of 
computation before the next move was made. They had to plan their movement through the 
environment, working on the principles of “sense-model-plan-act”.35 But the new behaviour 
based robotics of the late 1980s and early 1990s changed the approach: “These researchers 
are beginning to ask whether the robot need to model the visual world at all before acting 
upon it”.36  
 Brooks argued that there was no need to have a central system connecting the 
perception system (input) to the action system (output — “no single place where ‘perception’ 
delivers a representation of the world in the traditional sense”.37 His team discovered, through 
their work with robots navigating environments and avoiding obstacles, that “there need be 
no explicit representation of either the world or the intentions of the system to generate 
intelligent behaviors”.38 John Johnston has pointed to the similarities between these 
“distributed” approaches in scientific studies of perception and in robotics and AI 
(particularly in Brooks’ work), and Deleuze’s philosophy, in which consciousness and 
perception are acentred or distributed.39  
 
Optical Flow 
 The idea of “intelligence without representation” is connected to psychological 
theories in which perception is understood to be translatable to action without prior 
interpretation and which centre around a concept of “optical flow”.  This concept was 
introduced by James J. Gibson as part of his ecological approach to visual perception. Gibson 
challenged “the generally accepted assumption that the ability of an animal to respond to 
light and the ability of an animal to respond to objects are quite different problems”.40 He 
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proposed a theory of direct perception, in which animals and humans were able to register 
changes in illuminated surfaces, perceive other objects as moving and recognise depth, and 
thus navigate an environment, without having to make inferences and without the use of 
higher cognitive functions. 
 The same principle that underpins photography (digital and analogue) underpins the 
ability of the organism to see: light, “reflected in all directions from an array of surfaces” 
converges at any given point in the environment (including in an eye or a camera). This is its 
“projective” capacity, and it is the means by which animals and machines form images.41 The 
converging rays vary in intensity and frequency– together they form what Gibson calls an 
“optic array”. The ability of an organism to register changing patterns in this optic array is 
what facilitates its locomotion. Or more specifically, the eye registers “focusable light” and 
responds by focussing it, turning it into an image. In Gibson’s theory, the image, in itself, 
does not involve making sense of the environment: “the image is no more than a response-
produced stimulus”.42 An animal that remains still, in an unchanging environment, receives a 
static image, while an animal that moves passes through a series of “station points”, that is, 
artificially isolated moments in an otherwise continuous “optical flow”.43 It is the pattern of 
flow that the animal senses.  
 Gibson proposed that the eye (on animals that move) is a kinaesthetic organ, designed 
for locomotion. His approach, applied to robots, suggested their actions might be based on 
direct perception of light, and responses to optical flow. The robot’s ability to move depends 
not on reading individual images but registering the patterns produced in a sequence of 
images (“station points”) cut from a continuous flow.  In this context, the image is never 
singular but is singled out, the product of a “cut” made by the observer. The image flow is 
not paralysing but quite the opposite, it makes locomotion possible. Also, in this context, 
machine readability is not (theoretically at least) primarily dependent on the image being 
digital and translatable into code, instead it is light-dependent, photographic.44 
 The redistribution of perception, away from humans and other animals and toward 
machines does not require the development of a consciousness akin to that of human beings. 
In the  mobile robots of the late 1980s, “vision” was kinaesthetic and dependent on optical 
flow. Yet digital and electronic media have often been described as freezing and 
immobilizing the human observer, and machines that “see” as  primarily sinister surveillance 
devices or “vision machines” that choreograph human bodies in rigid and  dehumanizing 
ways. The roboticists’ nuanced understanding of robot perception as both similar and 
different to human and animal vision, and as independent of processes of cognition, has 
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generally not translated to the media theory context. For example, Mark B.N. Hansen argues 
(via Paul Virilio) that new technical vision systems threaten to exclude and marginalise 
human consciousness and experience: “In short, what we face in today’s vision-machines is 
the threat of total irrelevance: because our bodies cannot keep pace with the speed of 
(technical) vision, we literally cannot see what the machine can see, and we thus risk being 
left out of the perceptual loop altogether” 45  
 
Television 
 A different concept of flow had emerged in Raymond Williams’ 1974 study of 
television. Williams’ work considers the relationship between the onslaught of images and 
human perception and attention, and also brings in questions of mobility and the connection 
between technical images and an embodied material world. His analysis of American 
commercial television addresses the movement of images through a network, the movement 
of bodies in a living room, and other movements and flows: the commute from the suburb to 
the city, the flow of capital and finance, even the global movement of peoples. Williams’ 
book Television set out scaleable methods of analysis that can move from smaller to larger 
units — the single image, the sequence, the programme, segment, schedule — across a few 
minutes, a day or a week; and that could link the small scale  (the singular image or short 
sequence) to the large (global capital). His concept of flow developed his 1960s idea of 
“mobile privatisation”: television and radio were synchronized with the automobile and the 
suburb, scheduled around the suburban lifestyle and the commute to and from work.  
  Broadcasting facilitates the flow of capital by organising space and time to 
ensure the flow of capital, turning acts of spectatorship in the home into forms of work, and 
bringing together capitalism’s tendency toward increased mobility with its inverse tendency 
toward the static sphere of the home and the nuclear family (although, in television theory, as 
David Morley has argued, this concept of flow was adopted and adapted into a “travelling 
theory” with a tendency to romanticise mobility and marginalise the domestic).46  Williams 
later used the analogy of cars on a motorway, individual shells or pods of privacy, each 
moving with their own purpose, unconscious of being part of a larger determined and 
dehumanising system.47 As in the exchange of personal photographs across online networks, 
what is locally meaningful, rich and singular is (at one and the same time) co-opted into a 
more insidious general purpose (big data for example) which is not necessarily visible from 
the ground.  
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 In some ways, the model Williams was describing has broken down. Work and 
consumption now happen inside the home as well as outside it and we use platforms such as 
Twitter to broadcast beyond the private sphere — indeed, such platforms reveal the 
complicated and blurred ways in which people navigate ideas of publicity and privacy. In the 
2000s, a “mobilities turn” in social theory and in media and communications studies 
addressed questions of migration, tourism and other kinds of geographical mobility as well as 
the development of increasingly mobile media (via mobile phones in particular). This new 
emphasis on human mobility has challenged assumptions that connect the stable habitation of 
places with identity and belonging, but draws once more on Williams, particularly his notion 
of mobile privatisation, updating it for a new age of mobile technologies, social networking 
and multiple screens48.  Flow is now understood as happening across media technologies, 
platforms and different kinds of screen, such as the little screens of mobile phones, tablets, 
televisions and computer monitors. Such screens are increasingly and pervasively embedded 
into the environment: in cars, shopping centres, bus stops, aeroplane seats, fridges.49 
According to Kathleen Oswald and Jeremy Packer, advertising now follows the “flow of the 
user in time and space across devices”, and on-demand media transfers the responsibility for 
the “management of flow” to users or spectators.50 
 There is a risk that these uses of Williams’ theory give an impression of smooth 
movement which is actually at odds with his original theory of flow. Williams’ concept of 
televisual flow was formed in response to the way American commercial television allowed 
disconnected imagery to vie for attention. It was not concerned with the use of televisual 
techniques for naturalising or smoothing ruptures (as in continuity editing).  For Williams, 
flow meant a tumultuous, unstoppable sequence of rapidly changing sound and imagery that 
was characterised by sudden and surprising juxtapositions, particularly at the opening 
moments of programmes and ads, which were deliberately “violent or bizarre”. Flow here is 
not smooth and seamless or soporific, it is jarring, jagged, disruptive, and exciting. This is all 
about the rhythm and pace of perception and interpretation and attention.  
 There is an evident connection here with Walter Benjamin’s concept of shock as 
resulting from a new training of the human sensorium in modernity.51 Williams saw 
American commercial television in terms of a kind of training of the senses, its sudden 
disjunctures and rapid stimuli not as overwhelming the viewer or even just as hooking them 
in, but as part of a larger mobile capitalist culture to which Americans were becoming rapidly 
acclimatised. Images choreograph the robot and they choreograph us. Indeed photographs  
and cameras have always articulated bodies, producing new choreographies of both 
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photographer and subject: think of writings about how people arrange themselves for the 
camera, or the many descriptions of Cartier-Bresson in the act of taking a photograph as a 
kind of strung-up dancer, a cat, a humming-bird or insect, or Paul Frosh's writing on selfies 
as gestural and performative, bodily images.52  
 Recent theorists of the digital image participate in the mobilities turn, attempting to 
track how images articulate embodied human observers and technologies, not through visual 
representation but through algorithms and data, the dark underbelly of the flow of imagery. 
Lister warns of the danger of “throwing the baby out with the bathwater”, and indeed the 
challenge of this is how to address “big data” and simultaneously recognise the cultural 
specificity of images53.  Technical images such as photographs are more than just another 
form that information can take: they run the gamut from complex cultural texts to recordings 
of an optic array that can be immediately transformed into activity without the interception of 
any more complex reading. They are also changing accumulations, inadvertently gathering 
and redistributing their own data-microbiota that track their passage through a network, that 
link them to other images and that transform them invisibly. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 So how might these various and very different theories of “flow” help us to think the 
photographic image as an accumulation, a multitude, as mobile, frenzied, and embodied. 
Rather than cease to address the visual appearance of the image, we might treat it as a 
temporary articulation, an arrangement that will shift and change. While the movement of 
electronic images conceals economic, social and technological transactions, through a 
language of flow (and other liquid metaphors) we are encouraged to consume quickly and 
move along. In the face of this emphasis on seamless consumption, it may be ever more 
necessary to pause and practice different kinds of reading. This does not mean subscribing to 
the fiction of the singular image, assuming that the still image is ever really still, ignoring the 
mass of images for a few privileged examples, or adhering to old interpretative models. 
Instead, we might find in every image a collective, a means to delve not only into 
infrastructures of power but also into localised cultural expression and interaction; in 
Williams’ terms, to encompass the view inside the car, and the view of the motorway from 
above.  
 A flow analysis would insist on flow as jagged and jarring, overflowing and frenzied, 
and refuse to subscribe to the myth of seamless and smoothly continuous transactions.  It 
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would recognise that technical images involve new forms of acentred, dehumanised 
perception that are nevertheless optical and kinetic and not reducible to representation. It 
would address how images move between being produced and consumed by increasingly 
autonomous machines, becoming part of embodied and mental repertoires and cultural 
imaginaries, and being produced and reproduced as part of complex and rich cultural 
practices. It seems to me that it is crucial to observe the frenzied movement of images at 
different scales and temporalities not just across the technical network, but across broader 
social formations. This means pulling in, not just the more exotic or overtly sinister examples 
of technical imaging, but those located in suburbs and living rooms. It means talking about 
dreams and screens and the temporality of images, seeing images as part of our own 
sensorium, seeing technical images as both potentially outside our own perception circuit and 
inseparable from specific lives, specific human bodies.  
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